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Malaysia and Ghana both gained their independence from British rule in 1957. Both economies were 
relatively resource rich. Ghana was the leading exporter of cocoa while Malaya, as it was then known, 
was pre-eminent in exporting rubber and tin. This discussion paper, delivered at the Ghana Growth 
Forum, draws possible lessons from Malaysia’s high growth and economic diversifi cation over the 
decades that followed.
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A comparison of Malaysia and Ghana’s growth record shows divergence in growth rates, and 
differing structural changes to the economy. Malaysia, on average has grown at a faster rate 
than Ghana. In contrast to Malaysia’s post-independent experience, political instability was more 
pronounced in Ghana. Between 1957-81, for example, there were nine changes in government 
and four military coups. In Malaysia there was, relatively, political stability and continuity, no 
changes in government and the present coalition government is still in power, after more than 
50 years.
A Ghana Growth Forum was held in Accra on 10–12 November 2010 to consider the growth 
opportunities for Ghana. The experience of Malaysia was considered. Although the Forum 
was divided into separate groups, to encourage more in-depth discussions and the exchange 
of views on growth in Ghana, there was insuffi cient time to go into the details of the growth 
potentials of each of the broad sectors. In consolidating the suggestions and recommendations 
for Ghana’s growth, a macro approach was adopted.
The public lecture elicited quite an interest in Malaysia’s growth record and experience. They 
ranged from the approaches taken to foster national unity and greater integration between 
the ethnic groups to industrialisation strategies, gender, growth, planning, and monitoring and 
implementation of development plans, programmes and projects. This brief note provides 
highlights of the growth experience of Malaysia. This note only summarises the key features 
of Malaysia’s growth, ignoring the details and qualifi cations, and is based on the presentation 
that was made at the Growth Forum on “Economic Growth, Ethnicity and Governance in 
Malaysia”. Clearly no experience, or approach, can be transferred from one country to another 
without taking into account the different political, economic and social conditions. This brief 
note is not a complete account of what transpired at the Forum. A separate treatment would 
be required for this purpose. Nevertheless, these suggestions and lessons are put forward for 
policy makers in Ghana.
1. Economic Growth in Ghana and Malaysia
Malaysia achieved sustained growth of about 6 per cent per annum growth for the past 50 
years. The disparity ratio in per capita GDP has been substantial in Malaysia’s favour; Malaysia’s 
per capita GDP (US$) was almost three times that of Ghana in 1960, increasing to eight times 
in 1980, 15. 8 times in 2000 and almost 15 times in 2009. Malaysia is more industrialised than 
Ghana. Agriculture’s share of GDP in 2009 has fallen to 8.7 per cent from 34.3 per cent in 1960, 
compared to Ghana’s 40.8 per cent in 1960 and a third in 2009. Manufacturing in Malaysia 
accounted for 8 per cent in 1960 and 26.5 per cent in 2009 compared to Ghana’s 9.8 per cent 
in 1965 and 4.3 per cent in 2009. 
Exports of natural resource commodities, unlike Malaysia, continue to dominate Ghana’s 
exports and have a large bearing on its economic growth. Volatility in commodity exports can be 
detrimental to its long-term growth prospects. Gold now constitutes the largest export earner, 
accounting for about 36 percent of total exports in 2006, and close to 40 percent with rising 
gold prices, in 2008. Cocoa, timber and manganese exports follow gold in terms of shares of 
total exports. Cocoa production has been volatile; Ghana was the largest cocoa producer in 
1960s but production fell in the early 1980s, recovered in the 1990s up to the 2005-2006, and 
production fell again with poor weather in 2006/2007. Offshore oil, with estimated oil reserves 
of 1 billion – 1.5 billion barrels, was discovered in 2007 and commercial production is expected 
to commence in 2011.
Agriculture accounts for about half of the labour force and 43 percent of GDP in Ghana’s 
agricultural, resource-led economy. Manufacturing share of GDP at about 9 percent, is small. 
The diversifi cation of the economy is key if Ghana is to raise and sustain its economic growth. 
Manufacturing growth has to play a major contribution to raising employment opportunities 
in particular. The persistence of high levels of unemployment will impose heavy political and 
social costs.
Manufacturing growth has not been encouraging. The economic recovery programme in 1983 
had mixed impact on manufacturing, as reductions in subsidies and increased competition led 
to closures of manufacturing enterprises. Industries such as textiles, garments, metals, plastics 
and non-ferrous metal registered improvements. Nevertheless, Ghana’s light manufacturing 
industries, including textiles, food and beverages, cement and wood chemicals, dominate the 
sector. Despite initiatives to boost the sector it continues to face the constraints of a small market, 
high labour costs, high cost of utilities and raw materials and obsolete machinery. There has 
been some growth in non-traditional exports including agriculture and agro-processing industries 
(such as fi sh products and pineapples), processed timber and aluminium products. But the use 
of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor against infl ation, maintaining a strong exchange rate, 
has adversely affected the growth of non-traditional exports. Generally, Ghana’s current status 
in manufacturing is probably where Malaysia was in the 1960s. Malaysia’s post-1960s growth 
in manufacturing suggest that Ghana could exploit the growth opportunities of the sector with 
the right combination of policies.
Malaysia, compared to Ghana, managed to diversify its economy. Rubber and tin no longer play 
a signifi cant role in the economy compared to fi fty years ago. Malaysia is more industrialised 
with manufacturing sector accounting for more than 70 percent of total exports. Services are 
the largest sector. Within agriculture there has been diversifi cation, with palm oil surpassing 
rubber. Petroleum has taken over from tin which has ceased to play a role in generating export 
revenues. Electronics and electrical products continue to dominate manufactured exports, 
which have diversifi ed considerably. The export-led growth strategy has been instrumental in 
sustaining growth. And FDI has played a key part in the export-led growth strategy. 
Despite low and uneven growth in Ghana some progress has been made in reducing absolute 
poverty. Estimates of absolute poverty will differ, depending on the type of measurement used 
for the poverty line income. Using the World Bank’s at US$1.25 per day (PPP) to measure 
poverty, by the late eighties absolute poverty was about 35 per cent in 1989 and fell to 22.3 
per cent in 1997. Recent estimates from offi cial sources indicate that absolute poverty was 
just below 30 per cent. 
Malaysia’s poverty level has reduced considerably over the last 50 years. Using the offi cial 
poverty line income absolute poverty has fallen from about half in 1970 to 3.7 per cent in 2007. 
Using the World Bank’s US$ 1.25 per day (PPP) as the measurement for poverty showed that 
poverty was 3.2 per cent in 1984 and fell to 2 per cent in 2004. 
The behaviour of income inequality in Ghana and Malaysia shows some differences. There is 
no long series of income distribution available for Ghana to make a more careful assessment 
and comparison. Low and uneven growth in Ghana has been accompanied by a lower level of 
inequality when measured by the Gini coeffi cient and the evidence for the 1989-1997 period, 
part of the reform period, showed a rise in income inequality. Malaysia has recorded a fall in 
income inequality from 1970 and there have been episodes of rising and falling inequality since 
then. The same outcome of a rise in inequality has been recorded for Malaysia over the 1989-
1997 period but the level was higher in Malaysia than Ghana by the end of the 1990s.
2. Some Possible Lessons from Malaysia
The transferability of the approaches, and the lessons that come, will always be questioned. 
Many of the lessons may not be applicable to another country. Obviously, political, economic 
and social factors will have to be taken into account when attempting to apply lessons from 
one country to another. A completely sui generis stance, however, would be somewhat extreme 
and so a critical and judicious approach would be sensible.
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The possible lessons from Malaysia’s growth experience for Ghana could be summarised 
as follows:
Resource curse. Resource curse is avoidable and growth can be sustained. Malaysia is a relatively 
resource rich economy with its supply of land, and has exploited its land for the production of 
tin, rubber and palm oil. Petroleum resources have become important from the mid-1970s.
Diversifi cation. Diversifi cation is essential for growth. The diversifi cation strategies involved intra-
agricultural diversifi cation, utilizing resources to raise productivity and diversifi cation from tin and 
rubber into oil palm, and diversifi cation from agriculture to manufacturing industries.
Openness. Openness and international integration is helpful for growth. International trade and 
long-term capital fl ows made important contributions to the growth of the Malaysian economy. 
Integration with Asian economies was of growing importance.
Export-led growth. Exports were an important source of growth and trade intensity has increased. 
The growth of labour intensive manufacturing industries absorbed the surplus labour, especially 
from the rural areas, which opened up employment opportunities and raised income levels.
Human capital. Education has played a crucial role in sustaining economic growth and raising 
incomes of households. Large public investment in education is a necessity. Private education 
should be encouraged and can supplement the supply of human capital.
Stable prices and low infl ation. Growth with low infl ation is possible. Infl ation, with rare exceptions, in 
Malaysia has averaged less than 3 per cent for the past 30 years. A combination of price controls, 
subsidies and an open economy has helped to contain infl ation.
Full or near-full employment. Sustaining full employment with an unemployment rate of about 
3 per cent is attainable. But relatively high levels of growth puts pressure on labour supply and 
utilising immigrant labour has been necessary. A ready supply of low cost immigrant labour can 
discourage the upgrading of labour.
Private investment. Private investment, domestic as well as FDI, is vital for economic growth 
as reliance on substantial public investment is not sustainable. Competition for FDI has and will 
intensify and policy reforms and strong institutions will be needed to attract and retain FDI.
Fiscal discipline and managing revenue. Fiscal discipline and strict management of revenue, 
including resource revenues, is essential for macro-economic stability. Containing the fi scal 
defi cit and the national debt is essential for avoiding imbalances. Additional discipline through 
legal and administrative guidelines should assist the management of revenue. 
Industrial policies and FDI. Industrial policies are important for economic diversifi cation and FDI. 
Export-led growth of manufactured products needs to be supported by fi scal incentives and 
infrastructure support, including industrial estates and free trade zones (FTZs). FDI can make 
important contributions to the growth of manufacturing industries and exports.
Federal constitution and governance. Federal constitution can provide a strong framework for the 
governance of politics of oil and forestry resources. Regional interests to claim a larger share of revenue 
and resources have to be managed. Weaker state/regional government can dissipate revenue.
Strong independent national oil corporation. Importance of relative independence, capacity and 
capability of national oil corporation. The capability and capacity of Petronas, the national oil 
corporation, has been crucial in the management of revenue from petroleum. The capture by 
vested interests over the national corporation should be resisted. 
Ethnic Diversity and Inequality 
Pro-poor growth. Pro-poor growth is possible and necessary. Economic growth was a signifi cant 
factor in reducing absolute poverty. Agricultural diversifi cation, rural development and land 
development schemes reduced rural poverty. Manufacturing growth absorbed rural and urban 
labour and raised incomes.
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Growth-elasticity of poverty. There is growth-elasticity of poverty and inequality can be persistent 
and non-linear. Growth of GDP can lower absolute poverty. High inequality tends to lower the 
growth elasticity of poverty. Different growth strategies that raise GDP growth rates can have 
differential impact on lowering the incidence of poverty. 
Within and between group inequality. “Within group – inequality” is more important than “between 
group – inequality” to overall inequality. Strategies and policies that focus on inequality within 
groups can lower overall inequality.
Affi rmative action and the constitution. Affi rmative action policies and programmes need to be 
grounded constitutionally on any form of “social contract”. Affi rmative action provisions in the 
constitution should aim for clarity.
Costs of affi rmative action. Economic, political and social costs of affi rmative action need to 
be assessed. A careful assessment of the costs of affi rmative action is necessary. The costs of 
affi rmative action need to be compared with the benefi ts.
Political commitment to affi rmative action. Strong and continuous political commitment is 
necessary for affi rmative action programmes to work. There will be strong interest groups that 
will want to maintain or remove affi rmative action policies. These interest groups need to be 
identifi ed and anticipated to manage confl icts.
Longevity of affi rmative action. Consider longevity and time-bound affi rmative action. For how 
long can previous generations bind future ones? The impact of demographic on affi rmative action 
policies need to be anticipated and assessed. “Social contracts” made by past generations 
may no longer be fully supported by younger generations.
Ethnicity. The expectation that economic growth through industrialisation can remove or 
signifi cantly erode the salience of ethnicity may not be warranted.
Governance
Governance, leadership and institutions. Strong governance, leadership and institutions are 
good for growth. Weak governance, leadership and institutions will encourage a failed or 
predatory state.
Federalism and regional inequality. The balance of power between centre and periphery of 
governement determines growth and inter-state inequality. Federal government intervention 
is required if inter-state inequality is to be reduced and increased allocation to the poorer and 
lagging states is vital.
Institutions and processes. As economic growth is not distribution neutral it will tend to generate 
tensions between groups. Confl ict-management institutions and transparent and fair processes 
will be needed.
Limits of consociationalism. Consociationalism has its limits and needs to evolve with changing 
circumstances. Elite-bargaining through consociationalism worked to some extent to contain divisive 
elements and ethnic confl icts. Political and economic factors can undermine consociationalism, 
which has to evolve and to be reformed.
Corruption and rent-seeking. Corruption is positively correlated with direct state intervention in 
the economy. Corruption and rent-seeking increase the costs of economic growth, and blunts 
effi ciency and competitiveness.
Big Bang and incrementalism. There is a time and place for both major and incremental interventions. 
Experimentation, learing-by-doing and heterodox approaches should be encouraged.
Inertia and growth. Inertia and complacency are a possible consequence of growth succcess. A 
continuous review of factors that can impact on growth is necessary. Earlier approaches may 
no longer work and changing circumstances may require comprehensive reforms.
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Implementation and growth. Implementation of economic plans is crucial. A plan by itself cannot 
promote growth. 
3. Economic Growth – Sources and Strategies
Ghana’s growth record and experience can be divided into two broad phases with the early 1980s 
as a turning point. The accepted view is that growth was disappointing in the pre-1980s phase and 
that after 1983, when the Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) was introduced with the backing 
of the IMF and the World Bank, growth rates improved. The essence of the ERP was the economic 
liberalisation of Ghana’s economy, in contrast to its interventionist policy regime from 1960-1982. It 
has been emphasised that much of the growth outcome was due to the sizable public investment 
and infl ows of aid and not from private investment: capital accumulation from the public sector, 
therefore, drove economic growth but the contribution of total factor productivity (TFP), with varying 
contributions during the period, was not very signifi cant.
The two key features of Ghana’s growth record, as has been noted, are its uneveness and the 
lack of signifi cant structural changes. Because of its dependence on agricultural commodities, 
particularly cocoa, and minerals, especially gold, price volatility has exerted uneven infl uence 
on growth rates. Negative growth rates were recorded in 1966, 1972, 1975-1976, 1979 and 
1980-1983 and these tended to coincide with coup de tat, changes in government, or/and 
policy changes. Structurally there was some change as services raised its share of GDP while 
agriculture reduced its share but there was little change in the share of industry. The share 
of manufacturing fell in the latter part of the reform period with the slowest growth in the period 
1990-1996.
A longer term outlook for Ghana would be desirable and helpful to assess the prospects for Ghana’s 
growth and the efforts and resources that would be required to reach the target. Ghana has set itself 
a target of attaining the status of an upper middle income country by 2020 and to reach this target 
the economy would have to grow by 8 per cent per annum. In view of the changing conditions and 
the slowdown in growth, which is currently much less than the required 8 per cent per annum, it 
would be timely to review the achievability of the original upper middle income target.
Economic growth in Ghana will, in the near and medium term, be dependent on domestic rather 
than external demand. But it is vital that for its long term growth, exports must make a far larger 
contribution. Domestic demand will be limited by the level and growth of income and the size of 
its domestic market. A population of less than 30 million, is a relatively small market and the decline 
in Ghana’s long term population growth rates will exert an additional limitation. A continuation of 
a more effi cient and competitive import substitution strategy, a second round import substitution 
drive, should not be ruled out. However, as the limits of an import substitution strategy are reached, 
an export-led strategy, like that of Malaysia and many other Asian countries, will be critical.
An additional dose of realism would come from taking into account likely political developments. 
Ghana’s low growth, it has been observed, has been associated with changes in government 
and policy changes. Will this correlation still hold for the future? What is the likelihood of changes 
in the government over the period 2011-2020? If there is the likelihood of a change or changes 
in government, and if the association persists, then it may be prudent to inject a year or two 
years of lost growth i.e., negative growth rates, into the revised growth estimates for Ghana.
Apart from the broad strategic initiatives that have been suggested on the basis of the Malaysian 
experience, consideration should be given to some specifi c sources of growth for Ghana. Before the 
details are considered it would be useful for a long-term assessment of Ghana’s economy, medium 
and long-term plans, to be initiated. Malaysia has used medium and long-term plans as a framework 
and to provide some discipline to the allocation of resources. The long-term plan could cover the 
period 2011-30. Over this 20-year period there could be two fi ve-year plans for the period 2011-
15 and 2016-30. These should be indicative in nature and will need to be reviewed and adjusted 
accordingly with the changing circumstances. The long-term and medium-term fi ve-year plans could 
be integrated with the annual budgets over the period 2011-30. 
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A key part of the long-term plan would be the estimates of investment, especially private investment 
that would be required to lift the economy. The investment requirements should be disaggregated 
into public and private investment, and if possible, some estimates of FDI by sectors should also be 
made. Including the estimates of TFP’s contribution to long term growth will also give some idea as 
to what is required in raising productivity vis a vis factor accumulation. Some realism needs to be built 
into the re-assessment. The contribution of TFP to growth for low and middle income countries has 
been lower than for high income countries. Even Malaysia has missed its target for TFP contribution 
to growth in the past and a conservative approach will be required. If so the contribution of capital 
and labour to growth will have to be raised, making even more demands on fi nancial resources 
and investment in education and training for Ghana. Development expenditure that are allocated 
for the budgets should focus on specifi c programmes and projects. As always the critical need is 
not planning per se but the implementation of the strategies, policies and projects that are part of 
the development plans.
On the basis of available information the focus of Ghana’s growth strategies should fall on the 
growth opportunities in agriculture, manufacturing and services. Agriculture will continue to be a 
key source of growth and it will still retain its target share of GDP for some time. The additional 
focus should also be on rural development. Agricultural productivity will need to be raised 
considerably. Experiences in Malaysia and elsewhere point in the direction of raising R&D in 
agriculture, improving agronomics and establishing new institutions for agriculture. Land tenure 
problems that constrain productivity enhancement must be overcome. Commercialisation of 
agriculture should be pursued.
4. Manufacturing Growth and Export-led Growth
The industrialisation of Ghana’s economy must take top priority. So far, as has been stressed, 
growth has not been accompanied by signifi cant structural changes. Mining cannot be relied on 
for injecting structural changes to the economy. Manufacturing growth performed poorly in the 
second half of the 1990s, has stalled and its share of GDP is low. Capacity under-utilisation and 
high levels of protection were two outstanding features of the past approach to the manufacturing 
sector. After 1988 manufacturing growth slowed down and textiles, wearing apparel and leather 
goods were badly affected. Growth was better for sawmill and wood products and beverages. 
If Ghana is to move towards the upper range of a middle income economy by 2020, substantial 
progress in the growth of its manufacturing industries will be needed.  Manufacturing can absorb 
a sizable amount of the excess and unemployed labour and provide gainful and higher income 
occupations. Heavy reliance on agriculture to lift its average income level to the upper range of 
a middle income country would be misplaced.
The past experience in the 1960s and 1970s of Ghana, in promoting manufacturing industries 
and the strategies and policies that it has implemented, should be re-examined. It has been 
stressed that Ghana was unable to transit from an import-substitution industrialization strategy 
to an export-led growth strategy because of “severe policy confl icts” and the anti-export bias 
inherent in the pursuit of the import substitution strategy. The key challenge for the manufacturing 
sector, therefore, is to make a successful transition. The experience of Malaysia, and other East 
Asian countries, show that it can be done, and a closer examination of the possible lessons 
from Malaysia’s industrialization strategies would be useful exercise.
Manufacturing, including manufactured exports, at the moment, accounts for a relatively small 
share of Ghana’s GDP. The opportunities for resource and non-resource based manufacturing 
industries need to be developed. The Malaysian growth record also suggests that there are growth 
opportunities to the development of resource-based manufacturing industries. Rubber-based (e.g. 
rubber gloves) and oil-palm based products (eg, oleochemicals) are two examples of products in 
Malaysia manufactured largely for export markets. The growth opportunities for export-oriented 
manufacturing industries need to be carefully assessed. The African market beyond West Africa for 
Ghana’s manufactured exports will have to be exploited. 
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The early focus of the manufacturing sector on the processing of agricultural products gradually 
moved to higher value added resource based products. By the mid-1990s (1996) the exports 
of resource-based products accounted for about 15 per cent of total manufactured exports 
and it remained at that level by 2005. The three leading exports of resource-based products are 
wood products, chemicals and chemicals products, and rubber products. The deepening of the 
resource-based manufacturing industries is continuing with greater emphasis on the manufacture 
of even higher value added products. Apart from exports there can be substantial scope for 
the growth of resource-based manufacturing industries that serve the domestic market. A key 
requirement is, however, that these manufacturing industries should be competitive.
While the growth opportunities of resource-based industries for the domestic and export markets 
should be considered, the fundamental requirement is for the promotion of exports of non-
resource-based industries. Ghana will continue to be constrained by the size of its domestic 
market and its long term hope is to become a major exporter of manufactured products to the 
regional and global market.
The growth of the electronics and electrical manufacturing industries in Penang island in the north 
and its hinterland areas from the 1970s was a strategic turning point, and the commencement 
of the push industrialisation in Malaysia. An aggressive promotion of FDI by leading TNCs, 
granting generous fi scal incentives, establishment of Free Trade Zones (FTZs), infrastructure 
including industrial estates, utilities, training facilities, and supported by the strong leadership 
of the Chief Minister of Penang, turned the island into a mjor manufacuring centre. Can Ghana 
emulate in “picking the winners” to lift its manufacturing industries?
Ghana may well need to have some ideas on the long-term growth opportunities for its 
manufacturing industries. There seems to be a large gap in knowledge and interest in developing 
the manufacturing sector which needs to be rectifi ed. A long-term plan up to 2030 to look 
into the growth opportunities for the manufacturing sector should be considered. Such a plan 
should assess the growth opportunities for resource-based and non-resource based industries, 
manufactured exports and the possible markets for exports. Suggestions for specifi c policies 
on FDI, incentives for exports, free trade zones and other infrastructure requirements should 
also be included in the manufacturing plan.
Services accounts for the largest sector in terms of its share of Ghana’s GDP. As income rises 
and the economy undergoes structural changes, the expected fall in agriculture’s share to GDP, 
will be accompanied by the rise of services’ share to GDP. Growth opportunities will expand 
for fi nancial services, wholesale and retail trade, constructions and logistics. Special attention 
could be given to support the growth of education and tourism. As manufacturing sector grows 
manufacturing-related services will also expand and these will have to be encouraged.
The linkages, forward and backward, of services to the other sectors will differ with some having 
stronger forward than backward linkages, but the linkages to the manufacturing sector will be 
relatively strong, suggesting the need to allow for the growth of a wide range of services.
5. Monitoring and Implementation 
Governance and the quality of the leadership, and of course the political regime, matter a great 
deal in determining the success or failure of policy implementation. Malaysia’s federal system of 
government highlights the importance of checks and balance between the legislature, executive 
and the judiciary. Federal-state relations and its shifting balance can determine the quality of 
the outcomes, allocation of resources and inter-state economic disparities. Creeping centralism 
has been the hallmark of Malaysia for the past 30 years.
There is a wide range of governance issues in Ghana that have constrained co-ordination and 
implementation. The “reform cluster” approach to the implementation of policies and projects 
has become part of the Malaysian model. The Malaysian experience with monitoring and 
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implementation from the federal to the state levels could be given closer attention to assess 
their usefulness and transferability in Ghana.
Conclusion 
Malaysia and Ghana share some common historical past. Their economic and political experiences, 
however, have diverged with Malaysia registering a better growth record and level of income. There 
may be some lessons from Malaysia that could be considered by Ghana. But these possible lessons 
on growth need to be tempered by the differences, among others, of political systems, processes 
and of governance.    
Despite its achievements Malaysia has lost its competitive edge, especially to China and other 
emerging countries. It has languished for some time in the upper range of the middle income 
group. Its next challenge is to transform the economy and to move up to the high income group 
by 2020 with inclusive growth and sustainability.
Zainal Aznam Yusof
November, 2010
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Appendix
Figure 1: Real GDP growth rate (%), Malaysia vs. Ghana, 1961-2009
Figure 2: Agriculture sector share of GDP (%), Malaysia vs. Ghana, 1961-2009
Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank and International Financial Statistics, IMF
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Figure 3: GDP per capita growth (%), Malaysia vs. Ghana, 1961-2009
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Figure 4: Manufacturing sector share of GDP (%), Malaysia vs. Ghana, 1961-2009
Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank and International Financial Statistics, IMF
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Figure 5: Services sector share of GDP (%), Malaysia vs. Ghana, 1961-2009
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Figure 6: Agriculture exports as a share of GDP (%), Malaysia vs. Ghana, 1961-2009
Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank and International Financial Statistics, IMF
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Figure 6: Agriculture exports as a share of GDP (%), Malaysia vs. Ghana, 1961-2009
Sources: World Trade Organization
Appendix Table A1
Malaysia: Selected Macroeconomics Indicators
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Real GDP (US$ mn) 6,631 9,247 12,429 17,535 26,415 33,881 47,206 74,221 93,790 118,224 136,636
Real GDP growth (%) – 7.7 6.0 0.8 7.4 -1.1 9.0 9.8 8.9 5.3 -1.7
GDP per capita (US$) 815 973 1,145 1,431 1,919 2,161 2,608 3,604 4,030 4,612 4,974
Origin of GDP (% share of GDP)
Agriculture 34.3 28.8 29.4 28.9 22.6 19.9 15.2 12.9 0.9 8.4 8.7
Manufacturing 8.1 9.5 12.4 17.6 21.6 19.3 24.2 26.4 30.9 29.6 26.5
Services 46.3 43.8 43.2 37.2 36.3 41.6 42.6 45.6 50.8 51.2 57.6
Expenditure on GDP (% share of GDP)
Private consumption 64.0 63.8 60.5 59.6 54.2 55.4 51.7 47.9 43.8 44.8 54.3
Government consumption 10.6 14.2 15.2 17.1 16.0 14.8 13.8 12.4 10.2 12.3 13.4
Gross fi xed capital formation 11.9 16.4 18.2 25.6 29.9 28.7 33.0 43.6 25.3 20.5 23.7
GNI per capita (current US$) – 330 400 910 1,830 1,940 2,390 4,030 3,450 5,200 7,230
GNI per capita, – – – – 2,220 3,100 4,520 7,020 8,210 11,220 13,530
PPP (current international US$)
Consumer price infl ation (%) – -0.1 1.8 4.5 6.7 0.3 2.6 3.5 1.5 3.0 0.6
Exchange rate (RM per US$, 
average)
3.06 3.06 3.06 2.39 2.18 2.48 2.70 2.50 3.80 3.79 3.52
Trade (Exports + Imports, 
% of GDP)
89.0 79.4 78.7 85.6 111.0 103.2 147.0 192.1 220.4 212.1 229.3
External debt stocks (% of GNI) – – 12.0 21.9 27.5 68.6 36.4 40.6 48.6 39.5 35.0
Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank and International Financial Statistics, IMF
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Appendix Table A2
Ghana: Selected Macroeconomics Indicators
Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank and International Financial Statistics, IMF
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Real GDP (US$ mn) 1,900 2,213 2,550 2,518 2,640 2,584 3,267 4,029 4,977 6,364 7,949
Real GDP growth (%) – 1.4 9.7 -12.4 0.5 5.1 3.3 4.1 3.7 5.9 3.5
GDP per capita (US$) 280 282 292 252 239 199 218 234 255 290 333
GDP by sector (% share of GDP)
Agriculture 40.8 43.5 46.5 47.7 57.9 44.9 44.8 38.8 35.3 37.5 33.1
Manufacturing – 9.8 11.4 13.9 7.8 11.5 9.8 9.3 9.0 8.7 4.3
Services – 37.9 35.3 31.3 30.2 38.4 38.4 36.9 39.3 37.4 42.2
Expenditure on GDP (% share of GDP)
Private consumption 72.9 77.3 74.4 73.3 83.9 84.0 85.2 76.3 84.3 81.0 74.3
Government consumption 10.0 14.5 12.8 13.0 11.2 9.4 9.3 12.1 10.2 15.3 19.2
Gross fi xed capital formation – – 12.0 11.6 6.1 9.5 14.4 21.1 23.1 29.0 29.8
GNI per capita, (current US$) – 230 250 300 420 350 390 360 330 460 700
GNI per capita, – – – – 460 490 620 750 880 1,180 1,480
 PPP (current international US$)
Exchange rate (GH per 
US$, average)
0.00007 0.00007 0.0001 0.00012 0.0003 0.0054 0.03 0.12 0.54 0.91 1.42
Consumer price infl ation (%) – 26.4 3.0 29.8 50.1 10.3 37.3 59.5 25.2 15.1 19.3
Trade (Exports + Imports, 
% of GDP)
63.6 43.8 44.0 37.8 17.6 24.2 42.7 57.4 116.0 98.2 125.1
External debt stocks (% of GNI) – – 26.3 26.4 31.7 50.7 64.7 86.9 126.6 63.9 –
Appendix Table A3
Malaysia: Selected Socio-Economic Indicators
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1987 1989 1992 1995 1997 2004 2008 2009
Population growth (annual %) 3.1 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.7 1.7
Age dependency ratio (% of 
working-age population)
94.9 97.5 92.3 84.6 75.4 74.0 72.2 70.4 68.5 66.2 63.6 56.3 52.8 52.0
Literacy rate, adult total (% of 
people ages 15 and above)
– – – – 69.5 – – – – – – – 92.1 –
Gini coeffi cient – – – – – 0.486 0.470 0.462 0.477 0.485 0.492 0.379 – –
Poverty gap at $1.25 a day 
(PPP) (%)1
– – – – – 0.66 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 – –
Poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP) 
(%)2
– – – – – 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.5 1.3 1.4 – –
Poverty headcount ratio at 
$1.25 a day (PPP) (% of 
population)3
– – – – – 3.2 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.0  – –
Poverty headcount ratio 
at $2 a day (PPP) (% of 
population)4
– – – – – 12.3 11.9 11.1 11.2 11.0 6.8 7.8 – –
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Appendix Table A4
Ghana: Selected Economic and Social Economic Indicators
Population growth (annual %) 3.1 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 3.5 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1
Age dependency ratio (% of 
working-age population)
88.5 89.1 93.4 95.5 95.1 93.2 91.3 89.9 87.6 82.4 75.0 74.2 73.3 72.5
Literacy rate, adult total (% of 
people ages 15 and above)
– – – – – – – – – – – – 0.658 –
Gini coeffi cient – – – – – – – 36.0 38.1 40.8 42.8 – – –
Poverty gap at $1.25 a day 
(PPP) (%)1
– – –  – – – – 17.2 18.3 14.4 10.5 – – –
Poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP) (%)2 – – – – – – – 35.2 36.3 28.5 22.3 – – –
Poverty headcount ratio at 
$1.25 a day (PPP) (% of 
population)3
– – – – – – – 49.4 51.1 39.1 30.0 – – –
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day 
(PPP) (% of population)4
– – – – – – – 77.7 77.7 63.3 53.6 – – –
Sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank and International Financial Statistics, IMF
Notes: 
1,2  Poverty gap is the mean shortfall from the poverty line (counting the nonpoor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty  line. This measure refl ects 
the depth of poverty as well as its incidence. Note: Data showing as 0.5 signifi es a poverty gap of less than 0.5 
3  Population below $1.25 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 a day at 2005 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP 
exchange rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions. Note: Data showing as 2.0 signifi es a 
poverty rate of less than 2.0 percent.
4   Population below $2 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $2.00 a day at 2005 international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange 
rates, poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions. Note: Data showing as 2.0 signifi es a poverty rate of 
less than 2.0 percent.
Population below income poverty line (%)
$1 a day
1990-2005
$2 a day
1990-2005
National poverty line
1990-2004
Malaysia < 2 9.3 15.5
Ghana 44.8 78.5 39.5
Appendix Table A5
Poverty Indicators, 1990-2005
Sources: Human Development Report 2007/2008
Population below income poverty line (%)
$1.25 a day
2000-2007
$2 a day
2000-2007
National poverty line
2000-2006
Malaysia < 2 7.8 –
Ghana 30 53.6 28.5
Appendix Table A6
Poverty Indicators, 2000-2007
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